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ALL ABOUT DEMOCRATS



spine: what the Democrats need to win
see Mark Shields

eyes: how they see themselves
see Everett Ladd

voice: do the Democrats
speak with one?
see Ben Wattenberg

left flank: what the Democrats
need to guard against
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shoes: how much has
the style changed since 1972?
see George McGovern

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by I. A. Lewis and William Schneider

Black Voting, Bloc Voting, and the Democrats

An argument can be made that the black voter is more sophisticated than any other in American politics. No other group identifies its self-interest so well or promotes it so forcefully or consistently. Most politicians expect blacks to play a crucial role in the 1984 presidential election, and there is substantial evidence to support that belief. In fact, in some politically important areas, black participation might be decisive. The states of California, New York, Texas, and Illinois have more than a million eligible black voters apiece, and these four states alone have more than half of the electoral votes needed to elect the next president.

Black turnout in presidential elections has been rising steadily through the past several decades. In 1952, for example, only 23 percent of blacks turned out to vote—40 percentage points below the overall turnout for that year. But the black turnout rate in presidential elections has doubled since then. In the last presidential election, 45 percent of eligible blacks cast a vote—a turnout rate which is comparable to other important elements of the Democratic coalition: only seven points lower than union voters, six points lower than non-Protestants and southerners, one point lower than voters who live in central cities, and fifteen points *higher* than poor people.

Not surprisingly, the black share of the Democratic vote has risen along with increased turnout. In 1952, the black contribution to the Democratic vote was 7 percent. In 1980, blacks accounted for more than a fifth (22 percent) of all Democratic voters nationwide.[1]

All indications are that the trend toward higher black turnout has accelerated since the 1980 elections. In the 1982 midterm elections, *Congressional Quarterly* reports that blacks in many parts of the South voted at levels equal to those reached two years earlier, even though off-year turnout is typically only two-thirds as high as voting in a presidential year. In the Illinois gubernatorial race, former Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III, on the strength of a record black vote (one exit poll showed that 34 percent of blacks who voted in Chicago were doing so for the first time), came within a hair's breadth of ousting Republican Governor Jim Thompson. Higher than normal black turnout also figured importantly in Governor Charles S. Robb's 1981 victory in Virginia, in the 1983 election of Mayor Harold Washington in Chicago, and in the primary victory of Wilson Goode in Philadelphia. Boston's October 11 mayoral primary provides the most recent example, where black candidate Melvin King virtually tied with Raymond Flynn (both received 29 percent of the vote), in a field that included five other white candidates. There was a record voter turnout. Total citywide registration had increased by almost 53,000 votes, or 24 percent. City officials estimated that 40 percent of the new voters were black or Hispanic, many of whom, it appears, were attracted to King's candidacy.[2]

A voter turnout survey by ABC News in July detected few major differences in turnout rates between blacks and whites, despite sharp socioeconomic contrasts between the two races. Jeffrey D. Alderman, ABC News polling director, argues that blacks' strong party affiliation may explain why they turn out in larger numbers than one might expect, in light of their relatively

[1] These calculations are derived from Survey Research Center data by Dr. Robert Axelrod of the University of Michigan, reprinted in *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 76, June 1982, pp. 393-96.

[2] One recent exception to this overall picture of rising black political participation should be noted, however. The *Los Angeles Times* exit poll of the 1982 California election showed no unusual black participation in the race for governor. It has been suggested that the modest black turnout for the black candidate, Los Angeles mayor Tom Bradley, was the result of a deliberate Democratic strategy to avoid white backlash by de-emphasizing black appeals and concerns.

low socioeconomic status. Their allegiance to the Democratic party is stronger than white allegiance to both political parties combined. The ABC News poll also detects relatively high black political interest in presidential campaigns; 43 percent of blacks said they follow presidential races very closely as opposed to only 34 percent of whites.

A *Los Angeles Times* poll completed in mid-September of this year found a similar black concern about presidential politics. Seventy-eight percent of blacks, but only 64 percent of whites, said they were very interested or somewhat interested in following the political campaign for president. Moreover, 44 percent of blacks, compared with 30 percent of whites, claimed that Ronald Reagan has had the effect of making them want to become more active in politics. And a majority of blacks agreed that using the ballot box, more than any other course of action, was the best way to improve their condition.

Are black voters, then, bloc voters? The evidence suggests that they are, particularly in partisan elections. In presidential elections from 1944 through 1960, the black vote varied between 65 and 80 percent Democratic. Beginning in 1964, the black vote not only grew as a result of the Voting Rights Act, but also became almost unanimously Democratic. University of Michigan surveys show the black vote ranging between 87 and 100 percent Democratic (averaging 94 percent) in presidential elections from 1964 through 1980.

Consider another example. The September *Los Angeles Times* poll, taken nationwide, included an oversample of 599 blacks (in addition to 1,054 whites and others). An oversample of this size enables us to differentiate subgroups of blacks. For instance, about one-third of blacks describe their political views as liberal, one-third as middle-of-the-road, and one-third as conservative. When asked how they voted for president in 1980, however, these subgroups were indis-

Table 1
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ATTITUDES BY RACE AND CLASS

		Whites				Blacks		
	All	Middle	Working	Poor	All	Middle	Working	Poor
Unweighted N		344	259	103		131	204	121
Weighted %, by race		43	41	16		20	46	34
Political attitudes and behavior								
Percent voted for Jimmy Carter, 1980	31%	24%	38%	40%	89%	90%	86%	92%
Reagan vs. Mondale, 1984								
Reagan	51	58	51	40	9	9	9	10
Mondale	37	31	39	50	84	86	85	88
Reagan vs. Glenn, 1984								
Reagan	48	58	44	36	8	10	7	10
Glenn	43	33	50	54	81	83	80	78
Economic attitudes								
Feel economically vulnerable	32	24	36	47	47	34	51	52
Belong to the "have nots"	29	19	34	50	57	38	54	65
Reagan's policies are making the nation's economy better than it would have been	64	76	67	47	29	37	32	23
Reagan "has caused this depression"	19	13	15	37	56	35	54	69
Ideology								
Liberal	19	21	20	21	33	43	35	28
Moderate	39	39	39	38	28	25	27	33
Conservative	38	39	37	38	32	26	30	38
Racial attitudes								
Have experienced discrimination	25	28	28	25	58	70	65	50
Like most (black/white) people	70	75	70	67	77	62	77	75
Feel most (black/white) people like you	62	67	62	57	63	55	61	64
Feel black inequality is . . .								
Mainly due to discrimination	39	39	35	39	69	70	77	65
Because most blacks don't have the chance for the education it takes to rise out of poverty	51	57	48	44	67	67	65	64
Because most blacks just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty	56	55	60	65	45	36	40	56
Because most blacks have less in-born ability to learn	17	10	22	23	25	6	18	39
Believe President Reagan is prejudiced against blacks	11	13	11	12	41	30	44	47

Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, September 17-22, 1983.
Note: "Poor" = Those with family incomes of less than $10,000 in the preceding year. "Working Class" = Blue-collar respondents with middle ($10,000-$30,000) and high (over $30,000) incomes plus white-collar respondents with middle incomes. "Middle class" = High-income white-collar respondents and middle- and high-income respondents in professional and managerial occupations.

tinguishable. Reagan's support ranged from 3 percent among black liberals to a not-very-dazzling high of 6 percent among conservatives. By comparison, Reagan's vote was 44 percent among white liberals and 77 percent among white conservatives. How would these groups vote in a Reagan versus Mondale contest next year? Again, white voters split sharply along ideological lines: 38 percent of white liberals and 68 percent of white conservatives say they would vote for Reagan. Among blacks, however, the differences are minimal once again. Reagan pulls 8 percent of the black liberal vote and 10 percent of the black conservative vote. Table 1 looks at the white electorate and the black electorate by social class. The same definition of social class was applied to both races.

Blacks' socioeconomic standing is clearly lower than that of whites. The proportion of poor respondents is over twice as high among blacks as among whites, while the reverse is true for the proportion of middle-class respondents. As can be seen in the table, however, class differences do not come close to accounting for political differences between blacks and whites. Blacks are substantially more Democratic than whites at each level of socioeconomic status. The racial gap is particularly pronounced among middle-class voters. Middle-class blacks are two and one-half to three and one-half times as Democratic as middle-class whites. The gap is smaller among poor voters but still pronounced. Poor blacks are one and one-half to two times as Democratic as poor whites.

The white vote is moderately well differentiated by social class. The greatest support for Democrats comes from poor whites. Jimmy Carter, for example, did fifteen points better among poor whites than among middle-class whites in 1980. The black vote, however, is almost totally undifferentiated by class. It may be noted in passing that, whereas among white voters, John Glenn is a stronger Democratic candidate against Ronald Reagan than Walter Mondale, Mondale outperforms Glenn among black voters. This too is a racial difference, unrelated to class.

Should we conclude that class has no impact on the black electorate? Not exactly. Class differences in economic attitudes, for instance, are about the same for blacks as they are for whites. Both poor blacks and poor whites are more likely than middle-class blacks and whites to describe themselves as economically vulnerable (as opposed to secure) and as "have-nots" (rather than "haves"). The view that President Reagan's policies are making the nation's economy better than it would have been increases with social status in both races. The view that Reagan "has caused this depression" drops as class rises for both blacks and whites.

Even economic attitudes, however, have an important racial component. Blacks are more likely than whites at the same level to identify themselves as economically vulnerable and as "have-nots." Thus, 34 percent of middle-class blacks see themselves as vulnerable compared with 24 percent of middle-class whites. Twice as many middle-class blacks as middle-class whites call themselves "have-nots." Apparently race in and of itself carries with it a sense of economic disadvantage. Moreover, working-class blacks tend to resemble poor blacks in their economic attitudes. Working-class whites, on the other hand, are relatively closer to middle-class whites. Middle-class blacks and poor whites are not only the smallest groups in their respective racial categories, they are also relatively isolated in their economic attitudes from others of the same race.

Economic attitudes go a long way toward explaining the near-unanimity of black political behavior: (1) There are proportionately more blacks in lower status categories; (2) Working-class blacks are similar to poor blacks in their economic self-perceptions; and (3) All blacks share a sense of economic deprivation. There is still one puzzle, however. Why don't Republicans get more support from middle-class blacks? The answer is: ideology. Among whites, there are no class differences in ideology. Middle-class whites have almost exactly the same proportions of self-described liberals, moderates, and conservatives. Among blacks, however, there is a clear class pattern: middle-class blacks are more liberal than working-class blacks and poor blacks. What kind of liberalism is this? We know that it is not economic liberalism. The data show that middle-class blacks have somewhat more conservative economic attitudes than working-class blacks and poor blacks.

It appears to be racial liberalism. Seventy percent of middle-class blacks, compared with only 50 percent of poor blacks, say that they have personally experienced discrimination in their lives. In fact, the experience of discrimination rises steadily with social class among blacks. The reason is easy to figure out: Higher status blacks have more contact with white people as theoretical co-equals. Therefore they have many more opportunities to feel discriminated against. Middle-class blacks are also less inclined to say they like most white people and to feel that most white people like them.

Among whites, these class relationships are reversed: middle-class whites are the most apt to say they like most black people and to feel that most black people like them. The contact relationship is probably also reversed: middle-class whites are less likely than working-class whites and poor whites to come into contact with blacks as theoretical co-equals, simply because of the class distribution of the two races. The classes with the strongest probabilities of interacting with the opposite race—middle-class blacks and poor whites—show the highest levels of racial suspicion and distrust, though even in these groups racial animosity is a minor sentiment.

There are some class differences in racial ideology as well. Blacks of all social classes attribute black in-

equality to discrimination and to fewer chances for education. Poor blacks, however, are much more likely than higher status blacks to endorse the views that most blacks lack the motivation or will power to get ahead and that "most blacks have less inborn ability to learn." Indeed, more poor blacks than poor whites endorse the latter position. Higher status blacks are more sensitive to racism and are less likely to accept invidious racial distinctions, including the assertion that most blacks lack "the motivation or will power to pull themselves up out of poverty"—a view that is accepted by most whites.

It seems to be sensitivity to racial concerns—racial liberalism, as it were—that keeps middle-class blacks solidly Democratic. This is not unsophisticated racial bias, however. As table 1 shows, middle-class blacks are significantly less likely than working-class or poor blacks to believe that President Reagan is "prejudiced against blacks." The racial liberalism of middle-class blacks appears to be a rational calculation of black self-interest—that the Democratic party will do more for blacks—just as poor blacks and whites calculate their economic self-interest as inclining them toward the Democrats. Different forces appear to operate at different levels of the black social structure to produce

(Continued on page 59)

BLACK AND WHITE DEMOCRATS' ATTITUDES TOWARD REAGAN

Everyone knows that blacks are more anti-Reagan than whites, and that Democrats are more anti-Reagan than Independents or Republicans. The question is, are black Democrats more anti-Reagan than white Democrats? Several questions in the *Los Angeles Times* survey focused upon Ronald Reagan—his personality as well as his accomplishments—framed as statements with which respondents could agree or disagree. In the table below, we've compared white Democrats' reactions to these statements with black Democrats' replies, and it is obvious that party alone does not suffice as an explanation for blacks' distaste for the President.

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements about Ronald Reagan? . . .

	White Democrats	Black Democrats
He has started an arms race		
Agree	33%	40%
Disagree	55	40
Not sure	12	19
He has made changes for the better in the way our government works		
Agree	44	19
Disagree	47	71
Not sure	9	10
He is cutting back on worthwhile government programs		
Agree	62	72
Disagree	30	24
Not sure	8	4
He has caused this depression		
Agree	26	55
Disagree	70	37
Not sure	4	8
He has controlled inflation		
Agree	54	39
Disagree	41	59
Not sure	5	2
He's not really trying to reduce unemployment		
Agree	42	66
Disagree	51	26
Not sure	6	8
He is cutting waste in government		
Agree	50	36
Disagree	43	49
Not sure	6	14
He's behind the times		
Agree	36	61
Disagree	57	31
Not sure	6	8
He doesn't know what he's doing		
Agree	34	52
Disagree	60	40
Not sure	5	7
He's a strong leader		
Agree	57	41
Disagree	39	54
Not sure	4	5
He's too old to run for president again		
Agree	50	73
Disagree	48	23
Not sure	2	4
He sticks to his principles		
Agree	71	51
Disagree	24	38
Not sure	5	11
He has no idea what it's like to be poor nowadays		
Agree	75	87
Disagree	22	8
Not sure	3	5
He's too rigid		
Agree	49	70
Disagree	44	19
Not sure	7	11
He's sincere		
Agree	71	40
Disagree	25	55
Not sure	4	5
I just don't trust him		
Agree	37	68
Disagree	59	25
Not sure	4	5

by Everett Carll Ladd

A Party Primer

Although the 1984 presidential election is still a full year away, poll data on the course of the campaign are already piling up. On center section pages 30-32 of this issue, we present a generous sampling of Reagan-Glenn and Reagan-Mondale trial heats.

Before sitting back in our easy chairs to peruse these data, we should fortify ourselves with a large glass of caution. In the world of party activists, interest group officials, consultants, and journalists, Campaign '84 is already well advanced. But among the folks who will cast most of the ballots, next year's electoral decisions are still very remote. "If the 1984 presidential election were being held today," polls ask, "and the candidates were Reagan for the Republicans and Glenn for the Democrats, for whom would you vote?" But, of course, the election isn't being held today. The electorate is so far away from seeing the contest in decision-making terms—and volatile in its candidate preferences and ambivalent in its policy judgments—that the hypothetical trial heats are the flimsiest of straws in the wind. And even these "straws" are blowing in different directions. Thus Ronald Reagan's presidential approval ratings have risen into the high forties and fifties, which are considered pretty good, but in trial pairings he is basically even with Mondale and trails Glenn.

Taking Stock of the Parties

If we are well-advised at this stage to discount data like the above, we can still look to the polls for insights into the setting for the campaign. One area, to which we are devoting much of the center section of this issue, is a survey assessment of the makeup and outlook of the two major parties' rank and file.

The current social group composition of the Democratic and Republican parties at a first glance seems surprisingly similar to what it has been for the last half-century. In reviewing these data (pages 22-23), we see how slowly partisan attachments shift, even when actual voting behavior is in the greatest flux. The experience of the South nicely illustrates this.

The rise of a "two-party South" was first manifested in presidential voting thirty years ago. Today the southern states are clearly Ronald Reagan's best territory. According to a poll taken in late August by Penn + Schoen Associates for *The Garth Analysis*, a larger proportion of the electorate in the South than in any other region say that they are satisfied with the job Reagan has done as president, that they approve of his economic and foreign policies, and that they definitely plan to back him in 1984. The South is the only region where the President enjoys a clear margin over both Glenn and Mondale in the hypothetical trial heats. At the same time, though, the South remains the Democrats' best region *in party identification*. The Democratic lead over the GOP there is 26 percentage points, according to the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) General Social Surveys, compared to 13 points in the Northeast and Midwest and just eight points in the Western states. Since World War II this Democratic edge has eroded—but perhaps surprisingly little in view of the South's insistent presidential Republicanism.

Still, for all this persistence of partisan loyalties, changes are gradually occurring. Data on the parties' ethnic and religious makeup (page 24) indicate the continuing erosion of the old coalitions. While Protestants still constitute a somewhat higher proportion of the Republican than of the Democratic party, things have changed a great deal from the days when the GOP could fairly be described as "the Protestant party." Ac-

(Continued on page 41)

Table 1
MOST AND LEAST DEMOCRATIC AGE GROUPS

	Democratic	Republican	Independent	% Democratic minus % Republican
All ages	40%	24%	37%	+16
Ages 62-65	49	20	31	+29
Ages 30-33	40	14	46	+26
Ages 22-29	27	24	49	+ 3
Ages 78 and older	37	37	25	0

ON YOUR MARK, GET SET, GO!

JUMPING THE GUN ON CAMPAIGN '84

Question: Do you think political campaigns for president start too early or not?



Question: Does it help or hurt the political process for presidential campaigns to start as early as they do or doesn't it make a difference one way or the other?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Washington Post, July 28-August 1, 1983.

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WHO'S WHO AMONG DEMOCRATS,

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?



Note: The Party I.D. category "Other party/Refused to say" was excluded from all National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey data. All NORC-GSS data on pages 22 and 23 are based on combined 1980, 1982, and 1983 data, except for union membership, smoking habits, and drinking habits (combined for 1980 and 1983), and income (combined for 1982 and 1983).

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1980, 1982, and 1983.

Race:



Religion:



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

Age:



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

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

REPUBLICANS AND INDEPENDENTS

Family income:



Region:



Marital status:



Number of children:



Self described class:



Degree of happiness:



Drinking habits:



Smoking habits



WHO'S WHO CONTINUED: RELIGION AND ETHNICITY

Religion and Ethnicity	Black	Protestant German/ Austrian	Catholic German/ Austrian	Protestant Irish	Catholic Irish	English/ Scottish/ Welsh	Italian	Polish	Scandinavian	All other classified	Non-classified
Democrats	18%	8%	4%	5%	4%	12%	5%	4%	5%	20%	16%
Republicans	1	18	3	6	4	21	4	2	6	18	18
Independents	7	11	3	4	3	14	5	4	5	25	19

Democrats: Still the "Everyone Party"

Respondent's demographic identification	Percentage of subgroup belonging to Democratic and Republican parties: Democrats	Republicans	Difference Republicans to Democrats
Sex:			
Male	37%	23%	+14
Female	42	24	+18
Race:			
White	36	26	+10
Black	71	3	+68
Religion:			
Protestant	39	28	+11
Catholic	45	19	+26
Jewish	54	11	+43
None	27	9	+18
Education:			
Less than high school graduate	49	18	+29
High school graduate	38	23	+15
Some college	34	27	+ 7
College graduate	31	34	− 3
Post-graduate	34	27	+ 7
Age:			
Under 30	34	21	+13
30-39	39	18	+21
40-49	41	23	+18
50-59	43	27	+16
60 and over	45	29	+16
Occupation:			
Professional/ Technical	34	28	+ 6
Managerial/ Administrative/ Sales	31	33	− 2
Clerical/Kindred	38	25	+13
Skilled	38	21	+17
Unskilled	49	16	+33
Farmers	38	43	− 5
Household union membership:			
Union household	48	16	+32
Non-union household	37	27	+10
Family income:			
Less than $10,000	47	17	+30
$10,000-19,999	41	24	+17
$20,000-24,999	40	26	+14
$25,000-34,999	42	22	+20
$35,000-49,999	36	28	+ 8
$50,000 and over	24	44	−20
Region:			
Northeast	37	24	+13
New England	35	19	+16
Middle Atlantic	38	26	+12
North Central	37	24	+13
East North Central	37	22	+15
West North Central	38	29	+ 9
South	46	20	+26
South Atlantic	46	21	+25
East South Central	45	21	+24
West South Central	46	18	+28
West	37	28	+ 9
Mountain	30	31	− 1
Pacific	39	27	+12
Self-described class:			
Lower class	47	14	+33
Working class	43	18	+25
Middle class	37	28	+ 9
Upper class	34	29	+ 5
Religion and Ethnicity:			
Black	71	3	+68
Protestant German/ Austrian	27	38	−11
Catholic German/ Austrian	44	20	+24
Protestant Irish	41	28	+13
Catholic Irish	41	25	+16
English/Scottish/ Welsh	33	33	0
Italian	44	18	+26
Polish	44	17	+27
Scandinavian	36	28	+ 8
All other classified	37	20	+17
Non-classified	36	24	+12

Note: Percent of Independents of each subgroup not shown above but can be calculated by subtracting total number of Democrats and Republicans from 100 percent. "All other classified" groups = respondents who named an ethnicity which was a group not shown above. "Non-classified" = respondents who did not name an ethnicity. Data for this page are combined for 1980, 1982 and 1983 except for family income (1982 and 1983), household union membership (1980 and 1983).

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1980, 1982, and 1983.

VOTERS: A MICROCOSM OF THE NATION . . . BUT DIFFERENCES BY EDUCATION

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?



Note: Data combined for 1980, 1982, and 1983.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.



Question: Regardless of how you voted, in politics today do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else?



Note: Sample size = 9,742 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1980.



Question: Regardless of how you voted, in politics today do you consider yourself a . . . Democrat, Republican, Independent, or something else?



Note: Sample size = 24,438 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 2, 1982.



Question: Do you usually think of yourself as a: Republican, Democrat, Independent?

Note: Sample size = 15,201 voters as they left voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, November 4, 1980.



The Parties: More than A Dime's

REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS: MORE AT ODDS OVER REAGAN THAN HIS POLICIES









IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS: REFLECTIONS OF PARTISANSHIP



1 If the 1984 presidential election were being held today and the candidates were Ronald Reagan the Republican, and Walter Mondale the Democrat, for whom would you vote? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Sept. 22-26, 1983. **2** (If the 1984 presidential election were being held today) What if the candidates were Reagan the Republican, and John Glenn the Democrat, for whom would you vote? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Sept. 22-26, 1983. **3** Should Reagan run for a second term as president or not? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Sept. 22-26, 1983. **4** Would you say that inflation is more of a problem than it was a year ago, less of a problem, or what? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **5** On most political matters, do you consider yourself...liberal, moderate, conservative? (7,855 voters as they left voting booths) CBS News/*New York Times*, Nov. 2, 1982. **6** Regardless of the party you may favor, do you lean more toward the liberal side or the conservative side politically? (24,438 voters as they left voting booths) ABC News, Nov. 2, 1982. **7** We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a 7-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale? (Liberal = points 1-3 on scale. Moderate = point 4. Conservative = points 5-7. Question was asked of approximately half the sample or 804 respondents) NORC-GSS, 1983. **8** Now look at Card GG. (Card shows scale of 1 to 5, where 1 indicates government should do more, 3 is agreement with both statements, and 5 indicates government is doing too much) Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (Responses reflect the total of points 1 and 2 of the 5-point scale.) NORC-GSS, 1983. **9** A proposed amendment to the Constitution would require Congress to approve a balanced federal budget each year. Government spending would have to be limited to no more than expected revenues, unless

Worth of Difference on the Issues

ON ROLE OF GOVERNMENT, DEMOCRATS MORE PRO-STATE

Government should do more to solve country's problems



Would favor amendment requiring balanced federal budget
(Those aware of the proposed amendment)



Government should improve the poor's living standard



Would support increased funds for education, even if it meant higher taxes
(Registered voters)



Government has responsibility to help people pay medical bills



Federal spending for health should be increased



THE SOCIAL ISSUES: NO SURPRISES

Support the E.R.A.
(Voters as they left voting booths)



Favor death penalty for convicted murderers



Agree, blacks are not achieving equality as fast as they could because many whites don't want them to get ahead



a three-fifths majority of Congress voted to spend more than expected revenues. Would you favor or oppose this amendment to the Constitution? (Based on respondents aware of constitutional amendment to balance federal budget = 53%) Gallup, June 10-13, 1983. **10** I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at Card EE. (Card shows scale of 1 to 5 where 1 indicates government should be responsible, 3 is agreement with both statements, and 5 indicates people should take care of themselves.) Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (Responses reflect the combined points 1 and 2 of the 5-point scale.) NORC-GSS, 1983. **11** Would you support increased funds for education, even if it meant higher taxes? (1,025 registered voters) Penn + Schoen Associates for *The Garth Analysis*, Jun. 24-28, 1983. **12** Look at Card HH. (Card shows scale of 1 to 5 where 1 indicates the government should be responsible, 3 is agreement with both statements, and 5 indicates people should take care of such matters themselves.) In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (Responses reflect the total of points 1 and 2 of the 5-point scale.) NORC-GSS, 1983. **13** (I'm going to mention several general categories on which the federal government spends money. After each, please tell me whether you feel spending for it should be increased, decreased, or left about the same.) How about health? Should spending for it be increased, decreased, or left about the same? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug.

REPUBLICANS CONSISTENTLY MORE OPTIMISTIC

There are more opportunities for Americans today than in the past



Think most people try to be fair



Most of the time people try to be helpful



Agree that in this country if you work hard eventually you will get ahead



Feel generally optimistic about our system of government and how well it works



Economy will improve in next few years and be really strong



REPUBLICANS: MORE OFFENSE FOR DEFENSE

Federal spending for the military should be increased



Would favor sending American troops to El Salvador if that country were going to be taken over by Communist forces (Registered voters)



Subversion from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union is the greater cause of unrest in Central America today. (Other response: poverty and lack of human rights in area)



1, 1983. **14** Please mark an "x" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: I support the Equal Rights Amendment—E.R.A.—the constitutional amendment concerning women. (15,201 voters as they left voting booths) CBS News/*New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1980. **15** Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder? (Response shown is the more conservative response whereas for all other questions in the role of government section, the more liberal response is presented) NORC-GSS, 1983. **16** (I'm going to read a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree with it or disagree with it, or if, perhaps, you have no opinion about the statement) . . . Black people are not achieving equality as fast as they could because many whites don't want them to get ahead. ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **17** Since the time this country was settled, the United States has been called the land of opportunity. Do you think there are more opportunities for Americans today than in the past, or less opportunities today, or about the same today as in the past? Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-2) Jan. 8-22, 1983. **18** Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance, or would they try to be fair? NORC-GSS, 1983. **19** Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? NORC-GSS, 1983. **20** Do you agree or disagree that it is true in this country that if you work hard eventually you will get ahead? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **21** We'd like to know about the things on this list whether you feel generally optimistic about them as far as the future is concerned, or generally pessimistic about them, or uncertain about them? (Card shown respondent) What about the first item—do you feel generally optimistic about it as far as the future is concerned, or generally pessimistic about it, or uncertain about it. . . . Our system of government and how well it works? Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-3), Feb. 12-26, 1983. **22** Do you think the economy will improve in the next few years so that it will be really strong, or not? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jun. 15-19, 1983. **23** (I'm going to mention several general categories on which the federal government spends money.

Think the Soviet Union is ahead in military strength



Agree, we should be more forceful with the Soviet Union even if it increases risk of war

(1980 voters as they left voting booths)



Oppose a nuclear arms freeze with the Soviet Union

(1982 voters as they left voting booths)



NO DIFFERENCES ON UNDERLYING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VALUES

Courts are not harsh enough with criminals



Federal income tax is too high



Favor allowing voluntary prayer in schools

(Registered voters)



Approve of woman working if she has husband capable of supporting her



Would vote for qualified woman for president



U.S. should continue to belong to United Nations



After each, please tell me whether you feel spending for it should be increased, decreased, or left about the same) . . . The military? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **24** If it was clear that El Salvador was going to be taken over by Communist forces, would you favor or oppose sending American troops to fight to prevent a Communist takeover? (1,025 registered voters) Penn + Schoen Associates for *The Garth Analysis*, Jun. 24-28, 1983. **25** Which do you think is the greater cause of unrest in Central America today: subversion from Cuba, Nicaragua and the Soviet Union, or poverty and the lack of human rights in the area? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **26** As things presently stand, who do you think is ahead in military power, the United States or the Soviet Union, or do you think they are about the same in military strength? ABC News/*Washington Post*, Jul. 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **27** Please mark an "x" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: We should be more forceful in our dealings with the Soviet Union even if it increases the risk of war. (15,201 voters as they left voting booths) CBS News/*New York Times*, Nov. 4, 1980. **28** Please mark an "x" to show if you favor or oppose each of the following: A nuclear arms freeze with the Soviet Union. (7,855 voters as they left voting booths) CBS News/*New York Times*, Nov. 2, 1982. **29** In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals? NORC-GSS, 1983. **30** Do you consider the amount of federal income tax which you have to pay as too high, about right, or too low? NORC-GSS, 1982. **31** Do you favor or oppose allowing voluntary prayer in schools? (1,025 registered voters) Penn + Schoen Associates for *The Garth Analysis*, Jun. 24-28, 1983. **32** Do you approve or disapprove of a married woman earning money in business or industry if she has a husband capable of supporting her? NORC-GSS, 1983. **33** If your party nominated a woman for president, would you vote for her if she were qualified for the job? NORC-GSS, 1983. **34** Do you think our government should continue to belong to the United Nations, or should we pull out of it now? NORC-GSS, 1983.

EARLY

Reagan vs

★ See page 32 for data

For Political Junkies Only:

The cartoon on page 21 sums up how many of us who cover the polls feel at this point in the election cycle. The campaign is well under way for everyone, it seems, except the public. Pollsters are regularly asking their standard trial heat questions, and the people are dutifully answering, but at this early stage, even the answers are questionable. For those who perpetually cover the permanent campaign, the complete trial heats of five major pollsters are shown on these pages.

GALLUP



Note: "Lean to" responses included for each candidate.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 16-19, 1983.

ABC/*WASHINGTON POST*



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of September 22-26, 1983.

Reagan vs.



Note: "Lean to" responses included for each candidate.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 16-19, 1983.



Source: Surveys by ABC News/*Washington Post*, latest that of September 22-26, 1983.

Question: (Suppose the 1984 presidential election were being held tooday.) If President Reagan were the Republican candidate and Senator John Glenn were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (If "undecided" in December 1982, June 1983, July-August 1983 or mid-August 1983, or if "undecided/named other candidate" in February 1983, April-May 1983, ask:) As of today do you lean more to Reagan, the Republican, or to Glenn, the Democrat? (Gallup) **Question:** (Suppose the 1984 presidential election were being held today.) If President Reagan were the Republican candidate and Walter Mondale were the Democratic candidate, which would you like to see win? (If "undecided" in December 1982, June 1983, July-August 1983, or mid-August 1983, or if "undecided/named other candidate" in April 1982, June 1982, October 1982, February 1983, April-May 1983, May 1983, ask:) As of today, do you lean more to Reagan, the Republican, or to Mondale, the Democrat? (Gallup) **Question:** (If the 1984 presidential election were being held today) . . . What if the candidates were Reagan (the Republican) and John Glenn (the Democrat), for whom would you vote? (ABC/*Washington Post*) **Question:** If the 1984 presidential election were being held today and the candidates were Ronald Reagan the Republican, and Walter Mondale the Democrat, for whom would you vote? (ABC/*Washington Post*) **Question:** In 1984, there will be a presidential election. If the election were held today and the candidates were Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat John Glenn, for whom would you vote? (Penn + Schoen) **Question:** (In 1984, there will be a presidential election) If the candidates were Republican Ronald Reagan and Democrat Walter Mondale, for whom would you vote? (Penn + Schoen) **Question:** Now suppose for president in 1984, Ronald Reagan were running as the candidate of the Republicans and John Glenn of Ohio were the Democratic candi-

TRIALS

Glenn

PENN + SCHOEN



Note: Sample size for December 1982 = 1,000 registered voters; for February 1983 = 1,019 registered voters; for April 1983 = 1,003 registered voters; for June 1983 = 1,025 registered voters; for August 1983 = 1,010 registered voters.

Source: Surveys by Penn + Schoen Associates for the *Garth Analysis*, latest that of August 26-30, 1983.

HARRIS



Note: Results for April 1982 based on 912 voters; for January 1983 on 891 likely voters; for March-April 1983 on 1,829 likely voters; for June 1983 on 1,864 voters; for July 1983 on 1,048 who either voted in 1980 or who are registered to vote.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of July 14-18, 1983.

LOS ANGELES TIMES



Note: Sample size for April 1983 = 1,233; for May 1983 = 1,395.

Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, latest that of September 17-22, 1983.

Mondale



Note: Sample size for December 1982 = 1,000 registered voters; for February 1983 = 1,019 registered voters; for April 1983 = 1,003 registered voters; for June 1983 = 1,025 registered voters; for August 1983 = 1,010 registered voters.

Source: Surveys by Penn + Schoen Associates for the *Garth Analysis*, latest that of August 26-30, 1983.



Note: Results for March-April 1982 based on 1,863 voters; for January 1983 on 891 likely voters; for March-April 1983 on 1,829 likely voters; for June 1983 on 1,864 voters; for July 1983 on 1,048 who either voted in 1980 or are registered to vote.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of July 14-18, 1983.



Note: Sample sizes for April 1983 = 1,233; for May 1983 = 1,395.

Source: Surveys by the *Los Angeles Times*, latest that of September 17-22, 1983.

date—if you had to choose, would you vote for Reagan or Glenn? (Harris) **Question:** Now suppose in 1984 the election for president were between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans and former Vice President Walter Mondale for the Democrats. If you had to choose (today), would you vote for Reagan or for Mondale? (Harris) **Question:** And now suppose the 1984 general election for president were being held today and these were the candidates: Senator John Glenn of Ohio, the Democrat, and President Ronald Reagan, the Republican, for whom would you vote? (If undecided) Well, which one do you lean toward: Glenn or Reagan? (November 1982-April 1983). Suppose the 1984 general election for president were being held today and these were the candidates: Ohio Senator John Glenn, the Democrat, and President Ronald Reagan, the Republican. Which candidate, if either, would you vote for? (If undecided) Well, as of today, which one would you lean toward: Glenn or Reagan? (May 1983-June 1983) (*Los Angeles Times*) **Question:** Suppose the 1984 general election for president were being held today and these were the candidates: former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, and President Ronald Reagan, the Republican, for whom would you vote? (If undecided) Well, which one do you lean toward: Mondale or Reagan? (November 1982-April 1983). Suppose the 1984 election for president were being held today and these were the candidates: former Vice President Walter Mondale, the Democrat, and President Ronald Reagan, the Republican. Which candidate, if either, would you vote for (If undecided) Well, as of today, which one would you lean toward? Mondale or Reagan? (May 1983-June 1983) (*Los Angeles Times*)

REAGAN VERSUS GLENN

GALLUP
(Registered voters)

	Reagan	Glenn	Other/ Undecided
December 1982	39%	54%	7%
February 1983	40	45	15
April/May	37	54	9
June	38	53	9
July/August	41	45	14
August	40	46	14
September	42	48	10

ABC/*WASHINGTON POST*

	Reagan	Glenn	Other (Vol.)	Wouldn't vote (Vol.)	No opinion
January 1983	41%	44%	1%	5%	9%
March	38	47	4	2	10
April	44	42	2	3	9
May	42	45	1	3	9
June	39	52	1	3	6
August	43	50	*	1	6
September	41	51	1	1	6

PENN + SCHOEN
(Registered voters)

	Reagan	Glenn	Don't know
December 1982	40%	46%	14%
February 1983	41	45	14
April	37	50	13
June	44	42	14
August	41	47	12

HARRIS
(Likely/Registered voters/Voters)

	Reagan	Glenn	Not sure
April 1982	49%	46%	5%
January 1983	42	55	3
March/April	47	48	5
June	48	47	5
July	46	49	5

LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Registered voters)

	Reagan	Glenn	Would not vote	Not sure
November 1982	47%	42%	NA	11%
April 1983	42	48	NA	10
May	42	42	6%	10
June	38	52	2	8
September	43	47	3	7

REAGAN VERSUS MONDALE

GALLUP
(Registered voters)

	Reagan	Mondale	Other/ Undecided
April 1982	46%	46%	8%
June	43	49	8
October	47	44	9
December	40	52	8
February 1983	41	47	12
April/May	43	49	8
May	42	47	11
June	41	50	9
July/August	44	42	14
August	44	43	13
September	47	44	9

ABC/*WASHINGTON POST*

	Reagan	Mondale	Other (Vol.)	Wouldn't vote (Vol.)	Not sure
September 1982	45%	38%	2%	5%	11%
January 1983	42	44	2	6	6
February/March	39	48	3	2	7
April	45	45	2	3	5
May	45	42	2	5	6
June	42	50	1	3	4
July/August	46	49	1	2	3
September	44	49	0	2	5

PENN + SCHOEN
(Registered voters)

	Reagan	Mondale	Don't know
December 1982	41%	47%	12%
February 1983	43	44	13
April	42	46	11
June	47	39	13
August	46	43	12

HARRIS
(Likely/Registered voters/Voters)

	Reagan	Mondale	Not sure
March/April 1982	48%	49%	3%
January 1983	44	53	3
March/April	48	46	6
June	50	45	5
July	49	46	5

LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Registered voters)

	Reagan	Mondale	Would not vote	Not sure
November 1982	45%	48%	NA	7%
April 1983	45	47	NA	8
May	45	41	6%	8
June	41	47	3	8
September	46	43	3	8

Note: NA = not a response category * = less than 5%

Ideological Differences between Parties and among Democrats

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a 7-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?



Note: Liberal = scale points 1, 2, and 3. Moderate = point 4, and Conservative = scale points 5, 6, and 7. Data combined 1980, 1982, and 1983. In 1983 the question was asked of approximately one-half the sample or 804 respondents.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1980, 1982, 1983.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PARTIES...A

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)? . . . Improving and protecting the environment?

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



DEMOCRATS ONLY



Question: . . . the military, armaments and defense.

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



DEMOCRATS ONLY



Question: . . . Welfare.

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



DEMOCRATS ONLY



Note: Data combined for 1980, 1982, and 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

ND AMONG THE DEMOCRATS

Question: Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on (Read categories A & B). Which law would you vote for? A. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself whom to sell his house to, even if he prefers not to sell to (Negroes/Blacks) . . . B. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color.

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



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

Question: Now, I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



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

Note: Question on general housing issue shows data combined for 1980 and 1983. Question on allowing communist to speak combined data for 1980 and 1982.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . . she is married and doesn't want any more children.

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



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

Question: There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



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

Note: Question on abortion shows combined results for 1980, 1982, and 1983. Premarital sex question combined data for 1982 and 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Question: Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



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

Question: I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at Card EE. (Card EE shows a 5-point scale where 1 indicates the government should improve living standards, 3 is agreement with both positions, and 5 indicates the position people should take care of themselves.) Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this?

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS



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

Note: Question on importance of hard work vs. luck shows results combined for 1980 and 1982. Question on government improving poor's living standards shows combined points 1 and 2 on the scale. Data are from 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys.

Looking at the Gender Gap:

Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?



Note: *Liberal = point 1-3 (extremely liberal, liberal, and slightly liberal); Conservative = pt. 5-7 (slightly conservative, conservative, extremely conservative). Data combined for 1980, 1982, and 1983.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1980, 1982 and 1983 (combined).

	Democrats			Republicans	
	Men	Women	*National*	Men	Women
1. Approve of way Reagan is handling his job as president	39%	31%	*54%*	87%	85%
2. Approve his handling of the economy	36	27	*52*	84	83
3. Approve of the way Reagan is handling inflation	44	30	*54*	80	79
4. Approve of the way Reagan is handling unemployment	21	21	*37*	62	63
5. (Statement closest to own views) A. I like Reagan personally and approve of most of his policies	20	19	*38*	71	74
B. I like Reagan personally, but I disapprove of most of his policies	38	39	*30*	17	17
C. I don't like Reagan personally, but I approve of most of his policies	12	6	*9*	10	2
D. I don't like Reagan personally, and I disapprove of most of his policies	30	36	*21*	3	7
6. Should be possible for a woman to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children	43	41	*45*	50	44
7. Should be possible for a woman to obtain a legal abortion if she wants it for any reason	34	36	*39*	41	36
8. Premarital sex wrong only sometimes/not wrong at all	69	56	*62*	63	52
9. Federal spending on education should be increased	78	79	*75*	73	64
10. Federal spending on the military should be increased	30	28	*33*	43	41
11. Government doing too much to solve country's problems (points 4 & 5)	29	23	*36*	61	46
12. Government should do more to improve standard of living of poor (points 1 & 2)	40	44	*33*	15	22
13. Spending too little on environment	54	56	*54*	40	46
14. Spending too much on military, armaments, and defense	29	28	*26*	18	19
15. Spending too much on welfare	48	45	*53*	67	62
16. Allow Communist to speak in your community	53	51	*57*	60	51
17. Favor arms freeze	72	75	*67*	53	62
18. U.S. should spend whatever is necessary to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union	21	24	*22*	29	31
19. People get ahead by hard work (other response: lucky breaks or help from others)	58	64	*65*	64	67
20. If blacks would try harder they could be just as well off as whites	58	54	*57*	67	62

Caution Called For

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1 Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as president? ABC News/*Washington Post*, June 15-19 and July 28-Aug. 1, 1983 (combined). **2** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling the economy? ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **3** Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling inflation? ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **4** Do you approve of the way Reagan is handling unemployment? ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **5** Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion? A. I like Reagan personally and approve of most of his policies. B. I like Reagan personally, but I disapprove of most of his policies. C. I don't like Reagan personally, but I approve of most of his policies. D. I don't like Reagan personally, and I disapprove of most of his policies. ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **6** Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a woman to obtain a *legal* abortion if . . . she is married and doesn't want any more children? NORC-GSS 1980, 1982, 1983 (combined). **7** Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . . she wants it for any reason? NORC-GSS 1980, 1982, 1983 (combined). **8** There's been a lot of discussion about the way morals and attitudes about sex are changing in this country. If a man and a woman have sex relations before marriage, do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all? NORC-GSS 1982, 1983 (combined). **9, 10** I'm going to mention several general categories on which the federal government spends money. After each, please tell me whether you feel spending for it should be increased, decreased, or left about the same. How about . . . education? . . . the military? Should spending for it be increased, decreased, or left about the same? ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **11** Now look at Card GG. Some people think that the government in Washington is trying to do too many things that should be left to individuals and private businesses. Others disagree and think that the government should do even more to solve our country's problems. Still others have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (5-point scale) Points 1 & 2. I agree that the government should do more. Point 3. I agree with both. Points 4 & 5. I agree that government is doing too much. NORC-GSS, 1983. **12** I'd like to talk with you about issues some people tell us are important. Please look at Card EE. Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to improve the standard of living of all poor Americans; they are at point 1 on this card. Other people think it is not the government's responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself; they are at point 5. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? (5-point scale) Points 1 & 2. I agree that government should do more. Point 3. I agree with both. Points 4 & 5. I agree that people should take care of themselves. NORC-GSS, 1983. **13, 14, 15** We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount . . . improving and protecting the environment . . . the military, armaments, and defense . . . welfare. NORC-GSS 1980, 1982, 1983 (combined). **16** Now I should like to ask you some questions about a man who admits he is a Communist. Suppose this admitted Communist wanted to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not? NORC-GSS 1980, 1982 (combined). **17** Please mark an X to show if you favor or oppose each of the following . . . a nuclear arms freeze with the Soviet Union. (7,855 voters as they left the polls) CBS News/*New York Times* Nov. 2, 1982. **18** Which of these three statements comes closest to your own views? A. The United States should spend whatever is necessary to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. B. The United States should spend whatever is necessary to be about equal in military strength with the Soviet Union. C. The United States should limit its military spending, even if it means we may fall somewhat behind the Soviet Union in military strength. ABC News/*Washington Post* July 28-Aug. 1, 1983. **19** Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important? NORC-GSS 1980, 1982 (combined). **20** I'm going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree with it or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about that statement. . . . If blacks would try harder they could be just as well off as whites. ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 29-Aug. 1, 1983.

LIVING WITH THE RAT RACE

Question: We hear a lot about people being caught in the "rat race." That is, that they are so busy trying to keep up at their job, or keep the household running that they feel they really don't have much time to enjoy life. Do you feel you personally are in the "rat race"?



Question: Do you have friends or family that you think are in the "rat race"?

Question: Have you ever in the past made a real change in your life to get out of what you thought was the "rat race"?

Question: (If yes) Having made the change, do you think your life is a great deal better than it was, somewhat better, about the same, not quite as good, or not nearly as good? (Among the 40 percent who said they had made the change)


Having made the change, life now is:
A great deal better 46%
Somewhat better 38%
About the same 10%
Not quite as good 3%
Not nearly as good 3%

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 83-7), July 9-16, 1983

Ladd

(Continued from page 20)

cording to the NORC data, the two coalitions now contain exactly the same proportion of Irish Catholics. In fact, there is only one truly dramatic ethnic difference in party composition: blacks are roughly one-fifth of the Democratic alliance, while practically unrepresented among Republicans.

In what might be called their "cultural character," the two parties have gradually grown more similar. In the early 1980s, for example, Democrats and Republicans differ not at all in family size. As another example, a century ago a Republican presidential campaign could decry the Democrats as the party of "rum" (as well as "Romanism" and "rebellion")—but no more. The GOP is as "wet" as its opposition.

Age Composition

Party loyalties change slowly, and usually only well after actual voting behavior shifts; at any point they reflect yesterday's, not today's political agenda. In view of this lag, we look with special interest on the partisan attachments of voters. They are not wholly cut loose from yesterday, of course, because family socialization continues to shape them; but they reflect more of today's commitments than do older cohorts.

Does the most recent political generation differ from its predecessors? The data we examined, some of which appear on page 22, support only a cautious "maybe." The Democrats still have a clear edge in partisan identification among every age cohort, the young included. But according to many, though not all, of the recent polls, the Republicans face a smaller deficit among new voters than among any other group (with one exception: people seventy-eight and older).

Analysis of "political generations" came to the fore during the 1930s in the work of Karl Mannheim, Sigmund Neumann, and Rudolf Heberle. These scholars contended that people gain a frame of reference from the decisive events of the time when they first came to political consciousness—their late teens or early twenties, usually—which shapes their subsequent political commitments. While the record is by no means unambiguous, American partisan attachments of the last half-century show some persisting effects of such generational experience. According to Gallup data, for example, Americans who in 1951 were fifty years of age and older—and who thus "came of age politically" *before* the Great Depression and the New Deal—were markedly more Republican than all younger groups. By the late 1960s, however, the "over fifty" cohort was made up significantly of people who came of age *during* the Depression; and a Republican proclivity, compared to younger groups, was nowhere to be seen.[1] Generations "move through the pipeline."

In the late 1970s, some polls began showing Republicans doing their best at the extremes of the age continuum—among those eighteen to twenty-four and among the very oldest voters, who came of age before the Depression. This pattern now appears more frequently. The NORC surveys taken in 1980, 1982, and 1983 suggest that the current generational experience is "less unfriendly" to the GOP than that of the past, reaching back through the 1930s (see table 1).

According to these NORC data, the Democrats do best among the generations that reached maturity in the height of the Roosevelt years, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Conversely, the Republicans' best age groups are those who came of age politically in the "Roaring Twenties" and in the latter half of the 1970s. The contrast between representatives of the "sixties" generation and that of the late seventies is especially striking. The Democrats' edge over the Republicans is twenty-six points among those thirty to thirty-three years of age, compared to just three points among those in their early to mid-twenties.[2] Whether this generational shift continues and intensifies, or proves to be simply an intriguing short-term blip, remains to be seen.

The Everyone Party

In the late 1960s, poll data began showing the Democrats as a kind of "everyone party." Unprecedentedly, the Democrats had more adherents than the Republicans in virtually every social group. While the GOP did relatively better in some circles than in others, it had the edge almost nowhere.

Because so many people thought of themselves as Independents and, even more importantly, voted independently, the Democrats' plurality in party identification hardly gave them a secure majority status. Indeed, it was much less important as a precipitant or predictor of election results than as an *indicator of diminishing group polarization.* If pluralities of almost every identifiable social group thought of themselves as Democrats, group conflict couldn't figure very prominently in electioneering.

Data presented in the center section of this issue (page 24) still show the "everyone party" alignment. The Republicans have just a few bailiwicks in partisan identification—and only one of these seems secure, among those with family incomes of $50,000 a year and higher. The GOP also has a slight edge among those with bachelors' degrees (although not among persons with postgraduate education), among people in business and managerial jobs, among (perhaps) residents of the mountain states, and, outside the South, among Protestants of British and German ancestry. But that is about it.

Democratic-Republican Policy Differences

Various measures tell us that *leaders and activists* of the two main parties are sharply split on a host of policy issues. For example, analysis of ADA and ACA roll-call voting scores show the congressional parties divided to a degree that mocks the "tweedledum and tweedledee" view of American politics. But what about the party *rank and file*?

The latter are split most sharply on

(Continued on page 58)

Table 2

Question: Do you agree or disagree that it is true in this country that if you work hard you will eventually get ahead? (Percent agreeing)

	Republicans	Democrats	Republican % minus Democratic %
Less than high school education	70%	61%	+ 9
High school graduate/some college	73	57	+16
College graduate	84	47	+37

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, July 28-August 1, 1983.

by Burns Roper

Presidential Popularity: Do People Like the Actor or His Actions?

The frequent press contention that Reagan himself is far more popular than is his job performance seems to me a myth. It was *Jimmy Carter*, not Ronald Reagan, who was personally more popular than his job performance. Had it not been for a detailed analysis of Gallup's presidential rating question and the results it had produced over time, this conclusion would never have been revealed—at least not in this way. After plotting the Gallup "approval" rating over nearly seven complete presidential terms, the following things became apparent:

- A president's approval rating tends to rise for two or three months after he takes office.
- From that point on his approval rating is inclined to drop, drop, drop—though with a number of zigs and zags caused by specific events.
- In the event of a domestic crisis, regardless of what the president does or does not do, his approval rating almost invariably drops.
- In the event of an international crisis, regardless of what a president does or does not do, the immediate effect is for his approval rating to rise. (If the long-term effect of the international crisis is bad, then his approval rating reverses and drops sharply.)
- In about January of his fourth year, the president's rating decline halts and thereafter begins to rise again—whether he is running for reelection or retiring.
- If he is running for reelection and, in fact, is reelected, the pattern repeats itself. Ratings rise for three months, then fall with zigs and zags, then start to rise again after January of the fourth year. But the level of approval is generally lower at any point in the second four-year cycle than at the comparable point in the first term.

More pertinent to the purposes of this article, it quickly became apparent that the Gallup presidential rating question—which would seem to measure presidential job performance ("Do you approve or disapprove of the way [name president] is handling his job as president?")—in fact measures far more. Two examples will illustrate. President Kennedy's second highest approval rating occurred immediately following his

great success in the Cuban missile crisis. But, his highest rating of all occurred immediately following the Bay of Pigs debacle. If this Gallup question were measuring job performance alone, the only conclusion one could reach would be that Americans much prefer a big fiasco to a great success! A second example: President Eisenhower's approval rating shot up sharply after we were "exposed" by Russia and caught red-handed in the U-2 incident.

It seems evident that Gallup's rating question measures a mixture of job performance and emotional support for the president. In a domestic crisis, whatever the president does or does not do is certain to alienate someone and, hence, his ratings go down. But in an international crisis—and particularly if "our boy" is in trouble—patriotism springs to the fore and we rally in support around our leader.

Recognizing that the Gallup question measures more than job performance, we at the Roper Organization decided to write a different kind of presidential rating question—one that made no attempt to measure job performance. Instead, our question was designed to gauge visceral support for (or opposition to) the president. We hoped that our question might more nearly represent how people would actually vote at any given moment. The question is: "How do you feel about (name president)—at the present time, would you describe yourself as a strong (name) supporter, a moderate (name) supporter, a moderate critic of (name), or a strong critic of (name)?"

For the last couple of years, many in the press have been saying that while President Reagan's program is not terribly popular, the president himself is very popular with the public. A comparison of the Roper and Gallup questions during the Reagan administration would suggest that the president's personal popularity is not greater than his job performance rating. In fact, his personal popularity appears to be *lower* than his job performance rating.

Through July of the president's third year, there were ten Roper ratings on Reagan matched by ten Gallup ratings on Reagan at comparable times; these were in turn matched by comparable ratings by both polls during the Carter administration.

While both the Roper "supporter/critic" question and the Gallup "approve/disapprove" question measure a mixture of job performance and visceral feelings, it would be my contention that the Roper question is much more heavily weighted to the personal and visceral, and the Gallup question is much more heavily weighted toward both program and job performance. The ten comparable Roper and Gallup measurements taken during the Carter administration show that his *personal* rating was positive by an average of 17.9 percentage points through July of his third year, whereas his *job* rating was positive by a somewhat smaller 16.7 percentage points. What these figures say is that the average of the ten Roper measurements shows Carter's "supporter" figure exceeding his "critic" figure by a margin of 17.9 points. The average of the ten Gallup ratings shows Carter's "approval" rating exceeding his "disapproval" rating by 16.7 points. This says to me that Carter, the person, was slightly more popular than his job performance was.

Reagan's rating is the other way around. Looking at the Gallup and Roper polls at the ten comparable points in Reagan's first two and one-half years, the Roper poll shows Reagan's average supporter rating exceeding his critic rating by 2.7 percentage points. By contrast, the Gallup poll shows Reagan's average approval rating exceeding his disapproval rating by 5.7 percentage points. In other words, where Carter's

Drawing by Charles Adams; © 1982. The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

"Would you say Attila is doing an excellent job, a good job, a fair job, or a poor job?"

personal rating was slightly better than his job rating, Reagan's *job* rating is noticeably better than his personal rating. Carter's personal rating was 1.2 points above his job rating. Reagan's personal rating is 3.0 points *behind* his job rating.

Another conclusion that might be drawn from these Roper versus Gallup, and Reagan versus Carter comparisons is that President Reagan's job performance and, even more so, his personal popularity rate far worse than Carter's job performance and popularity. This interpretation would be correct if one were to talk about his *average* personal popularity rating and his *average* job performance rating over the first two and one-half years. It would, however, be an incorrect conclusion as of Summer 1983. While Reagan started out with a much lower rating than Carter when he took office, he held what strength he had better than Carter did, and by June and July of 1983 he actually had a somewhat higher supporter rating then did Carter in June and July of 1979. Of a dozen Roper ratings during Carter's first two and one-half years and a comparable number of similarly timed ratings of Reagan, June and July of 1983 represented the first times that Reagan's supporter ratings were higher than Carter's. So, while Reagan's *average* popularity during his first two and one-half years was lower than Carter's, his *latest* popularity ratings were somewhat higher.

In selecting the comparable Roper and Gallup measurements and the comparable times in the Reagan and Carter administrations, I have obviously avoided the Roper and Gallup measurements made immediately before and after the Iranians took our embassy personnel as hostages, for those ratings were taken later in the Carter presidency than we are as yet into Reagan's term. What happened to the two ratings before and after the embassy seizure, however, helps illustrate what the Gallup and Roper questions measure. In almost every measurement, the Roper supporter figure was substantially higher than the Gallup approval figure. Just prior to the embassy seizure, the Roper question showed 39 percent supporters; the Gallup question showed 32 percent approval. The embassy seizure, a curious mixture of an international event (it happened in Iran) and a domestic event (it was our people who were taken hostage), caused President Carter's supporter rating to shoot up by an unprecedented 14 percentage points—from 39 percent supporters at the beginning of November 1979 to 53 percent supporters in early December. But the president's rise in the Gallup question was nothing short of phenomenal—from 32 percent approval to 61 percent approval over the same period. This was the first of only two times during the Carter administration that Gallup showed a higher percentage for Carter than Roper did (the second time was just one month later, before the Carter support/approval started to evaporate).

This phenomenon makes at least two points clear, one of which is that the Roper question does, to a degree, measure job approval. What was seen as Carter's balanced and careful reaction to the initial seizure caused his supporter level to rise sharply, no doubt partly due to supporting our leader, but probably partly as well because of his job performance. The second thing that is clear, however, is that the Gallup question much more strongly measures job performance. Where Carter rose fourteen points in the Roper supporter rating, he rose by twenty-nine points—twice as much—in the Gallup "approval" rating.

It seems clear that the two questions measure somewhat different things and have different uses, though neither is better than the other. With all they can tell us, though, the questions still can't unravel the mystery of which component is more important in reelecting a president—personal appeal or an admirable performance. But we've finally straightened out which is which and who's got what.

Table 1

CARTER

	Gallup			Roper		
	Approve	Disapprove	Margin	Supporters	Critics	Margin
1977						
March	75%	9%	+66	77%	16%	+61
May*	66	19	+47	71	24	+47
Sept.	59	24	+35	63	31	+32
1978						
March	50	35	+15	53	40	+13
June	44	41	+ 3	48	44	+ 4
Sept.	48	34	+14	57	39	+18
Oct./Nov.**	52	36	+16	54	39	+15
1979						
January	43	41	+ 2	53	41	+12
March	42	44	− 2	49	48	+ 1
July	29	58	−29	35	59	−24
Average job rating ("Approve" minus "disapprove").			+16.7	Average personal rating ("Supporters" minus "critics")		+17.9

Note: *April/May for Roper
**October for Roper

REAGAN

	Gallup			Roper		
	Approve	Disapprove	Margin	Supporters	Critics	Margin
1981						
March	60%	24%	+36	62%	30%	+32
May*	68	21	+47	69	26	+43
Sept.	52	37	+15	54	41	+13
1982						
March	46	45	+ 1	46	50	− 4
June	45	45	0	47	48	− 1
Sept.	42	48	− 6	44	52	− 8
October	42	48	− 6	43	52	− 9
1983						
January	37	54	−17	40	56	−16
March	41	49	− 8	40	55	−15
July	42	47	− 5	44	52	− 8
Average job rating ("Approve" minus "disapprove")			+ 5.7	Average personal rating ("Supporters" minus "critics")		+2.7

Note: *April/May for Roper

by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann

The Missile Gap: The German Press and Public Opinion

The distinguished publisher and editorial writer Countess Marion Dönhoff of the prominent German weekly *Die Zeit* began her front page editorial in the March 25th issue with outright indignation. "Anyone who happened to be in the United States shortly before March 6th [the date of the recent German general election] would . . . be astonished by the extraordinary extent to which misconceptions prevailed there."

What was the misconception that made Countess Dönhoff so indignant? It was that the clear majority for the new government coalition of Christian Democrats and Free Democrats (Liberals) could be interpreted as a *pro*-American vote, an endorsement of NATO policies, and a vote of confidence in the military alliance.

Countess Dönhoff was correct in insisting that the Christian Democratic campaign did not emphasize defense policies, NATO, or German-American relations. Consequently the German election cannot be considered a plebiscite on the controversial issues of NATO defense policies versus the peace movement or neutrality versus the continuation of the Western alliance. But the Countess was wrong if she concluded that the election had nothing to do with these matters.

The general elections, normally held every fourth year, are designed to give citizens the opportunity to cast two votes—the first for a person, the district candidate, and the second for a party—to determine the general line of the government's policies. The elections are not supposed to serve as a plebiscite on specific policy options, although the results are often presented that way. Germany is a representative democracy; it is the task of the members of the Bundestag, the parliament, to make specific policy decisions. But if we keep in mind the true meaning of the Bundestag elections, deciding on the general direction of German politics, it is correct to say that the March 6th vote confirmed NATO defense policies and the priority of the German-American partnership. For the newly elected coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals—selected by a clear majority—supports this policy and the voters knew it.

The Christian Democrats based the main themes of their campaign on results from a poll conducted by Allensbach December 10-19, 1982. This survey was devoted to testing reactions to Chancellor Kohl's State of the Nation message, his two-hour speech on the new government's program delivered in October of 1982. For the purposes of our poll, the text of the speech was broken down into sixty-one separate statements—some verbatim and some slightly simplified. Reactions to these statements were tested according to five dimensions: 1. Urgency; 2. Credibility; 3. Agreement or disagreement; 4. Innovation or preservation of status quo; 5. Likelihood of success.

Seventy percent considered vocational training and job creation for the young especially pressing. "Fighting inflation" was seen as urgent by 67 percent; "reducing government spending and the budget deficit" by 64 percent; and "stopping the wave of bankruptcies which have recently forced so many firms to close down" by 62 percent. Only 20 percent thought that "providing German-American relations with a new basis of trust" was especially urgent.

Because the German people established bread and butter issues as priorities, so did the Christian Democratic campaign. Yet the March 6th results were also related to defense policies, and had implications for German-American relations. For example, the low percentage of people who considered it urgent to "pro-

vide German-American relations with a new basis of trust" should not be interpreted as a sign of disapproval. This can be shown by looking at the reaction to another statement in the Chancellor's speech: "The NATO alliance and our friendship with the United States of America are fundamental to our foreign and defense policies." Sixty-five percent of the population approved, and 19 percent disapproved.

Countess Dönhoff also quoted public opinion poll figures in her editorial. She wrote: "About 60 percent of the population opposes the idea of increased deployment of nuclear weapons on German soil." Does this mean that the Germans are, in effect, opposed to NATO defense policies? The answer to this is complicated.

The most stunning feature of public opinion poll results on NATO policies or German-American relations is how contradictory they are. This deserves a considerable amount of attention. Striking contradictions in public opinion poll results may have several causes. One explanation is that opinions on a topic are unstable—because the problem is new and has not yet been elaborated in public discussion, or because it is not of much interest, or because attitudes are changing.

Another possible explanation for contradictory poll results is that popular attitudes—quite stable on their own—clash with the attitudes promoted by the influential mass media. Such a conflict has led to contradictions in areas as different as education and divorce laws and the state of German-American relations.

The general population's views and those of leading journalists on NATO defense policies and German-American relations have been at variance for years. As early as the sixties, a comparison between content analysis of the most influential media and opinion poll results unearthed the discrepancy.

In the summer of 1976, we were able to compare actual survey results from interviews with leading journalists and the replies of a cross-section of the population for the first time. At that time 40 percent of the population said it was important "to strengthen NATO and the West German army in order to stop the Russians from gaining an ever-increasing military advantage over the West." Only 15 percent of the journalists gave this priority. There were similar chasms between journalists and the general public on related questions.

Just how much is public opinion affected by journalists' presentations of the news? The answer is not at all . . . or quite a bit. The results of opinion polls can be ordered along a spectrum: At one end are the basic attitudes of the population, rooted in emotion and measured, for example, by a question like this one, "Do you like the Americans or don't you particularly like them?" Opinions at this end tend to be firmly held. At the other end of the spectrum are questions about current events and people where judgments are formed almost exclusively on the basis of media reports. This is true, for example, if the country involved is far away and the population has no way of forming an opinion from first-hand impressions. A typical question of the latter type might have to do with the popularity of Ronald Reagan. At this end of the spectrum, opinions are far less stable and are thus more subject to the influences of events or their reporting. There is frequently a distinct difference in public sentiment between responses to questions that involve strictly personal, emotional reactions, and those involving judgments that must be formed from media reports. This, in turn, may lead to absurd contradictions between the answers. In this situation, it is easy to find polls results in support of diametrically opposed positions.

No doubt the readers of *Public Opinion* are familiar with reports in the leading American media on a new wave of anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic of Germany. These reports have always been somewhat misleading. Where the basic attitudes of Germans are at issue, we have never found a wave of anti-Americanism. In response to the question asked since 1957, "Do you like the Americans, or don't you like them particularly?", never more than 24 percent have said they do not. At the end of 1982, 22 percent disliked Americans, while 53 percent liked them. Influential German media have made many attempts to create a kind of anti-Americanism, but they have not succeeded—perhaps because many Germans have relatives in the United States.

The Germans' friendly attitude toward, and their trust in, Americans is confirmed by responses to another question with a similarly emotional emphasis: "Which country do you consider to be the best friend of the Federal Republic of Germany?" Forty-eight percent of the Germans named the United States; 15 percent named France; 6 percent Austria; 3 percent Switzerland; and the rest received 1 percent or less.

Where the answers in public opinion polls depend upon media content—what journalists decide to tell the public and how they present it—results are quite different. At this end of the spectrum we find the following opinions on President Reagan: In a poll taken at the end of 1982, 18 percent told us they had a favorable opinion of Reagan, and 51 percent told us they had an unfavorable opinion.

This unfavorable image of Reagan took shape even before he was elected president, but became especially pronounced during the second half of 1982. This must be seen in connection with the heated discussion of the proper German-American relationship, which accompanied the change of government in Germany last fall and the early stages of the German election campaign. Only in June 1982, after President Reagan paid a visit to Bonn and Berlin, did people have a chance to form their own impressions about the American president. A public opinion poll taken at the end of June showed that 40 percent of the Germans held a favorable opinion of Reagan, and 31 percent held an unfavorable opinion, a result completely different from earlier readings. But the favorable image gave way again to more

disapproving attitudes after Reagan had left, and negative reports once more dominated the media.

No Simple Answers

The basic attitudes of the German population toward NATO are positive, and show up again and again. In the following example, respondents were asked to read remarks of two people depicted in an illustration and then select the sentiment with which they agreed (see table 1).

Table 1

Question: There are different opinions about what relations between the Federal Republic and other nations should be like. Could you read what these two people are saying? Which of them would you tend to agree with? (Presentation of an illustration)

	June 15-24, 1982	July 1982	November 1982
"The alliance with America and with other friendly nations of the Western world has secured peace and freedom for more than 30 years. As a neutral nation, we would be too weak to defend ourselves by ourselves in case of an attack."	69%	53%	65%
"The freedom of the Federal Republic would not be threatened if it were neutral. And we can do more for world peace and for countries getting along with each other if we do not belong to either of the two power blocs."	19	26	22
Undecided	12	21	13

As further proof that not all Germans are antagonistic to the United States, only 21 percent of the German adult population would welcome a withdrawal of American troops from Germany; 54 percent would regret the American soldiers' departure (see table 2).

While the population normally dislikes the acronyms which are so common in modern political and economic language, it has taken the four letters "NATO" to heart. In May 1981 the Allensbach Institute included a popularity test in one of its surveys: "Does the word NATO sound appealing or unappealing to you?" Sixty-five percent answered "appealing"; 17 percent "unappealing." When asked: "What is your personal opinion—should West Germany remain a member of NATO or should it withdraw?", people replied in May 1981 exactly as they had twelve years earlier (January 1969): Nearly 80 percent said "remain in NATO" as against 6 percent saying "withdraw."

The basic doctrine of NATO, the policy of deterrence, was supported by a clear majority in late 1982, as it was in the mid-seventies. "If someone said that an attack from the East could best be prevented by deterrence, if the West was itself adequately armed, would you agree with him or not?" The last time the question was repeated—it has been asked eight times since 1976—at the end of 1982, 55 percent agreed, against 25 percent who disagreed.

The philosophy of the West which is behind the present negotiations at Geneva also is supported by a majority of the German population. In January 1983 we used the following question: "It is only if the Soviet Union is completely sure that American medium-range missiles will be stationed in Europe by the end of 1983 (unless an agreement is reached in Geneva) that we can count on them contributing to the success of the Geneva negotiations." Fifty-seven percent agreed; 32 percent disagreed.

What is the German attitude toward the NATO two-track resolution? There are two possible answers. When both parts of the decision were presented to the respondents for the first time in May of 1981 (that is, when the question wording included both sides of the track), a majority of 53 percent supported it and 20 percent were opposed to it. The question read: "The NATO two-track decision was made some time ago. According to this decision, the NATO countries have agreed, on the one hand, to station missiles in Europe to offset the Soviet medium-range missiles and, on the other hand, to take the initiative in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. On balance, do you think this two-part decision is a good thing or not?" At the end of 1982, even after the peace movement had waged an intensive battle for public opinion, the situation was almost unchanged: 51 percent were in favor, 25 percent opposed.

But there is a second answer. If you change the question wording slightly and, rather than mention both parts of the decision, cite only the intention of deploying new American medium-range missiles, the picture changes quite a bit. Here is the question: "NATO—the Western defense alliance—plans to deploy American medium-range missiles in the European members countries of NATO, for example in the Federal Republic of Germany, to counterbalance Russian medium-range missiles. Do you think that this should be prevented or not?" In December 1982, a plurality

Table 2

Question: If you read in the paper tomorrow that the Americans were withdrawing their troops from Europe, would you welcome this or regret it?

	July 1956	Jan. 1957	Dec. 1957	June 1962	April 1969	May 1970	May/June 1973	June 1976	Aug. 1978	Sept. 1979	Sept./Oct. 1981	Oct. 1982
Welcome it	51%	33%	34%	12%	17%	22%	23%	15%	17%	11%	17%	21%
Regret it	22	34	34	59	56	51	45	54	57	60	59	54
Undecided	27	33	32	29	27	27	32	31	26	29	24	25

of 47 percent felt that the deployment of new American medium-range missiles should be prevented. Only 28 percent felt that the deployment of the new weapons should go ahead.

A journalist who writes about German attitudes toward the NATO two-track decision can thus choose whether he will report the first result, a majority in favor of the NATO two-track decision, or the second result, a plurality against deployment of American medium-range missiles. In her editorial, Countess Dönhoff decided to base her argument on the second result.

Responses to the different questions on the NATO two-track decision have remained stable in spite of the highly controversial discussion of the last several years in Germany. A gradual change in Germans' attitudes can be detected, however, under the influence of intensive efforts to make deployment of the new medium-range missiles politically impossible—that is, to make it impossible in the face of stiff resistance by public opinion. The gradual change is noticeable if one considers attitudes toward the central demand of the German peace movement, the demand for unilateral disarmament. This question was presented as a dialogue: "Here are two people talking about disarmament. Please take a look at this. Which of the two says what you also think? . . ." One opinion was as follows: "I think that we will make progress with disarmament only if one side takes the initiative. That would be proof of good will that the other side can't ignore. This would really lead to peace and to the relaxation of tensions." The other: "I see things differently. The government that begins unilateral disarmament lays itself open to possible attack. It is subject to blackmail and thus contributes more to insecurity than to peace between the East and the West." When this question was first put to the population in July 1981, we found a clear plurality of 47 percent against unilateral disarmament. At the time, 33 percent approved of the idea. But little by little attitudes have changed. At the end of 1982, we found that the numbers in favor of unilateral disarmament had grown from 33 percent to 41 percent, while the opposition had decreased from 47 percent to 44 percent, making the two sides almost equal in strength.

All this demonstrates that a kind of psychological warfare is taking place in the struggle for German public opinion. This struggle was already occurring in 1976; even then the ground was being prepared for opponents of the two-track decision who would prevent deployment at any cost. While 40 percent of the population felt then that the strengthening of NATO and of the German army was a priority, only 15 percent of a cross-section of journalists felt it was.

The German population is slowly but surely being convinced of the Soviet Union's commitment to peace. Mid-January 1983 queries represented the first time that a plurality (45 percent) believed the Soviets were committed to seeking a reconciliation with the West. On one other occasion, at the height of Chancellor Willy Brandt's new Ostpolitik in 1970 and 1971, a relatively large number of Germans conceded that the Russians were committed to this: 33 percent and 35 percent. But most people were doubtful: 46 percent and 51 percent said at the time they did not believe in this commitment.

In January 1980, following the invasion of Afghanistan, trusting responses fell to a twenty-five-year low for the Russians: Only 16 percent thought the Russians were committed to reconciliation, and 70 percent thought they were not. But three years later, the picture had changed completely, with a plurality (45 percent) of the Germans believing in the Soviet Union's commitment and only 37 percent doubting it (see table 3).

Results from polls taken during the 1983 campaign should be seen against this background. At first glance it might appear that Germans are ready to give up the policy of alliance they had endorsed earlier. Answers to a general question about German foreign policy showed that between 1977 and 1981, a clear majority (approximately 50 percent) had regularly favored closer cooperation with the United States; about 38 percent had favored equal cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union; and almost no one (1 or 2 percent) had favored closer cooperation with the Soviet Union. At the height of the election campaign, during which the Social Democrats took as their peace slogan "Disarmament and cooperation for security with the Soviet Union," the climate of opinion was dramatically different from the 1977-1981 atmosphere. Only 40 percent favored closer cooperation with the United States, while 49 percent favored equal cooperation with the United States and Russia (see table 4).

Germans find themselves in a bind between their attitudes toward the United States, which are usually very friendly, and the argument that we must be more conciliatory toward the Russians. We see an example of

Table 3

Question: Do you feel that the Russians are basically committed to seeking a reconciliation with the West at present, or don't you think so?

	April/ May 1959	April 1965	April 1966	Mar./ April 1970	June 1971	July 1974	Feb. 1977	Jan. 1980	July 1981	Mid-Jan. 1983
Think so	17%	23%	26%	33%	35%	29%	27%	16%	36%	45%
Don't think so	57	56	54	46	51	55	60	70	48	37
No opinion, undecided	26	21	20	21	14	16	13	14	16	18

Table 4

Question: A general question about German foreign policy: In the future, should we cooperate equally with the United States and Russia, or more closely with Russia, or more closely with the United States? What is your opinion?

Germany should cooperate:	May 1973	Oct. 1977	Sept. 1978	Jan. 1980	May 1981	July 1981	Nov. 1981	Dec. 1981	Jan. 1982	Mar./ Apr. 1982	June 1982	Nov. 1982	End Jan. 1983	Feb./ Mar. 1983
More closely with the U.S.	36%	49%	51%	49%	56%	50%	41%	45%	42%	43%	54%	44%	39%	40%
More closely with Russia	3	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	2	1	2	1	1
Equal cooperation	54	38	36	41	32	37	41	41	44	43	39	48	51	49
Undecided	7	11	12	8	11	11	16	13	12	12	6	6	9	10

Table 5

Question: There are different opinions about what relations between the Federal Republic and other nations should be like. Could you read what these two people are saying? Which of them would you tend to agree with? (Presentation of an illustration) November/December 1982

		Party Preference				Favor a German foreign policy that is:		
	Total	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	Greens	Closer to U.S.	Equally close to U.S./U.S.S.R.	Closer to U.S.S.R.
"The alliance with America and the other friendly nations of the Western world has secured peace and freedom for more than 30 years. As a neutral nation, we would be too weak to defend ourselves by ourselves in case of an attack."	65%	82%	56%	82%	29%	83%	55%	23%
"The freedom of the Federal Republic would not be threatened if it were neutral. And we can do more for world peace and for countries getting along with each other if we do not belong to either of the two power blocs."	22	11	29	11	57	9	32	66
Undecided	13	7	15	7	14	8	13	11

this conflict when the approximately 50 percent who favored equal cooperation with the United States and the Soviet Union at the end of 1982 are asked to respond to the dialogue question about neutrality. Only one-third (32 percent) thought that the Federal Republic could afford to become neutral; 55 percent favored the present alliance policy (see table 5).

Confusion reigns, but there is no reason to criticize the population for holding contradictory views. I have tried to indicate that some of the most influential media in Germany treat the question of the Western defense alliance negatively and offer much publicity to those politicians who advocate keeping an equal distance from the United States and the Soviet Union. This is bound to have an effect on public opinion in the long run. It is actually surprising how much German public opinion has resisted media pressures and how stable the pro-American stance has remained.

In turn, the American press often plays up demonstrations of German anti-Americanism more than they deserve to be in the context of the actual German mood. This could create the impression in America that the Germans are moving fast in the direction of anti-Americanism and possibly neutrality. If this type of reporting goes on at both ends, it may acquire real political weight.

The media evidently play a great role in shaping the image the population has of the United States. A study of July 1981 comparing images the Germans have of their own country, the Federal Republic, on the one hand, and of the United States, France, and Japan, on the other, shows that stereotypes predominate among the notions the German population has of America. The United States is, they believe, a nation characterized by a lot of crime and great social injustice. Phrases such as "industrious, hard-working people," "a functioning democracy," and "a country with a great future" rank at the bottom of a list of national qualities. The notions that stand out are that America is a powerful industrial nation, good at sports, and a land of great scholarly achievements.

To separate Germans into two groups, those who like the Americans and those who dislike them, would be to oversimplify. America stands for defense readiness and "anti-Americanism" is merely one side of the battle being waged for public opinion. Its aim is to create a climate of opinion which will prohibit the deployment of modern medium-range missiles this fall.

A definite majority of those who like the Americans agree with the NATO two-track decision: 57 percent as against 18 percent. Those who do not like the Americans are split almost right down the middle on the question of the NATO two-track resolution: 40 percent approve, 35 percent are against it. So, in Germany, to like the Americans or not like them has become a question of great political import. Dispelling the image of the ugly American could thus be strategically significant.

by Henry O. Hart

The Tables Turned: If East Europeans Could Vote

For almost twenty-five years the Audience and Opinion Research Department of Radio Free Europe (RFE) has been conducting surveys among Czechoslovakians, Hungarians, and Poles. Surveys of Romanians and Bulgarians have been taken for shorter periods. For obvious reasons, our samples are not directly selected from the resident populations inside Eastern Europe. We draw our samples from the large numbers of people—more than two million every year—traveling to different Western European countries, where independent samples are then selected. Repeated independent samples help verify results, in much the same way they do in the biological sciences.

Nine opinion research institutes in six different countries conduct independent samples, using methods that help minimize any environmental or interviewing biases. Generally, each overall survey for any nation is based on at least 1,000 interviews and is judged reliable only if the results obtained from the composite samples reveal no statistically significant differences. The samples consist only of Eastern European nationals visiting the West who plan short stays, and who intend to return to their respective Eastern European homelands; we do not interview refugees, legal immigrants, or other persons intending to stay in the West.

We can compare results from our traveling population samples with surveys on non-sensitive subjects conducted inside various Eastern European countries. In unusual cases, for example the short-lived Dubcek era in Czechoslovakia and the Solidarity period in Poland, internal surveys prove reliable even on the more sensitive topics. At such times, even political questions are answered truthfully and without fear. We can use these results to validate our "external" surveys, and we have found high degrees of similarity. There are a number of other methods by which we check our samples, and we are confident that the results are reliable.

Surveys conducted inside Eastern Europe have shown that the desire to travel to the West is widespread. In this respect, the "stay at home" populations and the travelers are remarkably similar. There are fewer differences in socioeconomic background between the travelers and the stay-at-homes than one might suspect, too, because the regimes in Eastern Europe are careful to satisfy the travel aspirations of less privileged groups, like workers and farmers. Most Eastern European regimes have policies granting exit visas only once every three years at most, so we are assured a turnover of travelers for the samples. Destinations tend to be influenced by policy and chance, rather than by individual choice, providing a more or less random selection of Western travel destinations. Different independent research institutes in Western Europe conduct the interviews, and the results from one country must be consistent with the results obtained in other countries. Comparisons of our results, taken over a great number of years from many samples, have shown remarkable consistency. Only about one in five travelers refuses to be interviewed.

What Listeners Expect

Two examples of survey work done by the Audience and Opinion Research Department are discussed here to give the reader an idea of the breadth and nature of the enterprise. First, given the unique mandate of RFE and its leading position among Western radio stations broadcasting to Eastern Europe, it has been important for the radio to establish what listeners expect from it.

To do this, we interviewed 3,194 RFE listeners from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria between the spring of 1981 and early 1982. Polish data gathering stopped with the introduction of martial law in that country in December of 1981.

Earlier surveys had established that reliability and trustworthiness, as expected, are important to RFE listeners. Beyond that, the surveyors wanted to learn whether the listening public envisions any larger role

for the radio, so they asked, "Should RFE foster gradual changes in your country, should it foster a different system there, or should it do neither but simply report developments?" as a benchmark question.

The first alternative meant that RFE should actively participate in the processes by which—even in a totalitarian system—pressures from below may force the power oligarchy to make concessions. The second alternative implied RFE's participation in bringing about a different system, with the means being left to the respondent's imagination. The third alternative, by contrast, defined RFE as an inactive observer.

As table 1 shows, almost one-half of the Hungarian, Polish, and Bulgarian listeners, and a large plurality of the Romanian listeners, wanted RFE to pursue "gradual change." The Czechoslovakian results, derived from a sample representing a smaller core audience of highly motivated listeners, showed an unexpected preference for an inactive reportorial role for RFE. The aborted reformist experiment of 1968 seems to have played a part here, as strongly indicated by the fact that the Czech listeners who had experienced the Prague Spring directly showed far less faith in gradual change than the Slovaks did. Twenty-six percent of Czechs supported a radio that fostered gradual change, 27 percent a different system, and 42 percent simply reporting. Of Slovaks, the percentages were 47, 30, and 19, respectively.

The Polish results in the table antedate the declaration of martial law and thus reflect an historical moment when official authorities (party and state) found themselves challenged at every turn by an emergent center of power—Solidarity. In spite of their unique international situation, Polish listeners viewed RFE's role in much the same way as did listeners from most of the other countries.

Our surveys also found that a majority of 80 percent or more in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria were *regular* listeners—those who tuned to RFE broadcasts several times a week. A smaller majority of the Czechoslovakian audience were regular listeners. Regular listeners (as shown in table 2) tended to advocate an active role for RFE, while those who listened less frequently tended strongly to prefer the role of inactive observer and reporter. Polish listeners were distinctive; both regular and infrequent listeners preferred *active* participation by RFE.

By articulating courses of action that would speed up or broaden anti-regime developments in Eastern Europe, RFE would be acting in concert with the desires of its regular listeners. It could do so without endangering its tentative contact with less frequent listeners, and without threatening the prospect of expanding its audience.

Table 1

Question: Should Radio Free Europe foster gradual changes in your country, should it foster a different system there, or should it do neither but simply report developments?

	Czechs	Slovaks	Hungarians	Poles	Romanians	Bulgarians
Should foster gradual changes	26%	47%	48%	46%	40%	45%
Should foster different system	27	30	15	21	30	28
Should simply report developments	42	19	35	30	29	22

Note: Results are for 1981. "Other" and "no answer" not shown.
Results for the entire Czechoslovakian sample = "Gradual changes" 31%; "Different system" 28%; and "Report developments" 37%.

Hypothetical Free Elections

Normally, a survey's accuracy is confirmed by subsequent events—for instance, actual election results in the United States verify trial heat forecasts. Of course, so such direct proof is available to us because there are no free elections in Eastern Europe. At times, however, political developments have occurred that our surveys predicted correctly. These predictions cannot be as precise and direct as we would like, but they give us confidence in our accuracy when we have to test things that cannot be confirmed.

As one example, for fourteen years all RFE surveys have included a question asking the respondent's political party choice if free elections were held in his or her country. Respondents choose from five parties representing a left to right continuum familiar to Europeans. The answers have been remarkably consistent over the years. When answers varied, the changes in the poll presaged actual political and/or economic changes within a country.

The data here cover the period 1974-1981 and are presented as three-year rolling averages, which, as

Table 2

	Czechs/ Slovaks		Hungarians		Poles		Romanians		Bulgarians	
	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Should foster gradual changes	31%	30%	51%	35%	47%	44%	44%	21%	48%	35%
Should foster different system	37	13	17	3	23	10	31	22	33	13
Should simply report developments	28	57	29	56	28	37	25	55	15	44

Note: A = Regular RFE listeners (80% or more in Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria; 50% or more in Czechoslovakia) B = Semi-regular plus irregular listeners

their name indicates, move forward in time by dropping the earliest year in the triad of surveys in favor of the current year. Rolling averages seem to reveal long-range tendencies that could be obscured by insignificant yearly fluctuations. Table 3 shows the Czechoslovakian results.

Table 3
Czechoslovakian Party Preferences

Question: Imagine that free elections were to be held in your country and there would be five different kinds (types) of parties from which to choose: a Communist party; a Democratic Socialist party; a Christian Democratic party; a Peasant party; and a Conservative party —which of these would you vote for?

	1974-77	1975-78	1976-79	1977-80	1978-81
Communist party	4%	5%	4%	4%	3%
Democratic Socialist party	43	45	46	46	43
Christian Democratic party	25	24	26	29	29
Peasant party	5	6	5	5	3
Conservative party	7	8	9	9	8

Note: 8,978 interviews.

The most striking aspect of the table is the similarity of results for the entire period. The increase in the Christian Democratic party "vote" probably relates to the religious revival and increasing church attendance that has appeared in Czechoslovakia since the late 1970s. The decrease in Peasant party preferences is paralleled by a steady decline of the already small farming population in the country.

Except for the Peasant party, all political parties in Czechoslovakia are, at least to some extent, supported by all social strata. The significant demographic differences are briefly these: Men seem to favor Democratic Socialism, women Christian Democracy. The Christian Democratic party is also the party of the older people; the younger would more readily "vote" for Social Democracy. Only farmers chose the Peasant party. The Conservative party was selected by the best educated and by those in the professions.

In Czechoslovakia, there were no significant differences between choices of RFE listeners and non-listeners. We have learned in other studies that most differences in political attitudes between listeners and non-listeners have disappeared since the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia.

When we look at Hungarian responses to the same party preference question, once again the most striking aspect of the results is their consistency over time. (See table 4.) Only the small Conservative party registered a gain—probably because of growing dissatisfaction among the most anti-regime population with the distinct lack of change (for good or bad) in the country. This immobility is possibly also the reason for the unchanging "voting" patterns. The decline in Peasant party support is probably explained by the decreasing farming population in Hungary.

As with the Czechoslovakian sample, all parties, except the Peasant party, would obtain some support from all population groups. The demographic distributions of major party choices were almost identical to Czechoslovakia's, except that among Hungarians there was no difference between men's and women's choices.

In Hungary, the Communist party received 7 percent of the "vote." Demographic differences are slight, except that those in the higher occupational groups dominate, probably because of their *real* party affiliation and the job opportunities it affords them.

Table 4
Hungarian Party Preferences

	1974-77	1975-78	1976-79	1977-80	1978-81
Communist party	8%	7%	6%	7%	7%
Democratic Socialist party	42	42	43	43	42
Christian Democratic party	25	24	26	24	26
Peasant party	17	17	15	14	11
Conservative party	5	6	7	9	10

Note: 8,890 interviews.

Unlike the Czechoslovakian sample, the Hungarian respondents gave distinctly different answers depending upon whether or not they listened to RFE. Listeners were much more conservative in their party choices than were non-listeners. The Hungarian results are the most pronounced here: no such differences could be detected among Czechs and Slovaks, and Polish RFE listeners did not differ nearly as much from their non-listening compatriots as Hungarians did.

Table 5
Hungarian Party Preferences

	RFE listeners	Non-listeners
Communist party	2%	11%
Democratic Socialist party	33	54
Christian Democratic party	37	16
Peasant party	10	9
Conservative party	12	7

Note: Results are for 1981.

The Polish "voting" trends show much more fluctuation than the Czechoslovakian and Hungarian results did. The explanation undoubtedly lies in the Polish internal situation, which is marked by widespread economic and political discontent and resultant periodic upheavals leading to changes in the top leadership. Consequently, the last triad reveals a decline in the Communist "vote"—down to 1 percent for 1981.

The steady downward movement of the Democratic Socialist party can be seen in the same light. The increases enjoyed by the Christian Democratic party, the Peasant party, and the Conservative party complement the picture. We see in Poland a definite move away from the left (39 percent) and toward the right (56 percent), and the virtual disappearance of Communist "voters."

Table 6
Polish Party Preferences

	1974-77	1975-78	1976-79	1977-80	1978-81
Communist party	4%	6%	6%	7%	4%
Democratic Socialist party	46	43	40	38	35
Christian Democratic party	28	28	31	32	34
Peasant party	11	12	13	14	15
Conservative party	4	4	5	7	7

Note: 11,959 interviews.

Before 1981 all parties received some support from every social stratum in Poland. The most significant demographic differences were among young people, who tend to favor the Democratic Socialists and among older age groups, which veer in the direction of the Christian Democrats and the Peasant party. The Democratic Socialists have the support of the better educated and the Peasant party of the least educated. The latter party is chosen mainly by farmers, but otherwise, occupational differences were slight.

It is interesting to note the different "voting" patterns of Radio Free Europe listeners and those who do not tune in. RFE listeners—about 65 percent of the Polish adult population—lean more to the right than non-listeners and thus typify the overall trend away from the leftist preponderance of 1974 and 1975.

Table 7
Polish Party Preferences

	RFE listeners	Non-listeners
Communist party	0%	3%
Democratic Socialist party	32	40
Christian Democratic party	42	27
Peasant party	14	17
Conservative party	8	7

Note: Results are for 1981.

Those favoring a left Democratic Socialist party are in many ways as anti-Communist as those favoring the parties to the right of it. The picture which emerges is one of an extremely broad East European consensus against communism and, thus, the regimes that represent it. The "voting" patterns are very similar to those in many West European democracies.

"But, comrades, aren't you going to ask me if I wish to return home or not?"

Unwavering anti-Communist attitudes are shared by the young people of Eastern Europe. The latest survey showed that only 1 percent of those under thirty-five years of age in Poland, 2 percent in Czechoslovakia, and 6 percent in Hungary would have voted Communist in hypothetical free elections. These figures are exactly in line with the national averages and reveal that Communist indoctrination has failed. Indeed, it seems to enhance active resistance to communism—as amply demonstrated by the role of the Communist-educated younger generation in the Hungarian Revolution, the Prague Spring, and recurring Polish crises.

Communist Failures

The party preference question was asked for the first time in 1968. The cross-national results for the first triad (1968-1970) were strikingly similar. These early results reflect the effects of the 1968 invasion in Czechoslovakia: one consequence was a low Communist party vote even in Hungary. Immediately after the invasion, the Communist party "vote" in Czechoslovakia dropped to 0.3 percent; later, the small number of traditional opportunists returned to the party fold. In the days of the Prague Spring, Dubcek's party would have obtained 12 percent of the vote in a free election, an all-time Communist party high in our surveys. The usefulness of the triad computation could not be better demonstrated, since both the 12 percent high and the low of 0.3 percent lasted only a few months.

The end of the Prague Spring also affected the Democratic Socialist party vote negatively. The other three parties were more or less unaffected, when viewing the entire fourteen-year trend, except that the Polish Peasant party began a steady climb in the early 1970s as conditions for the independent Polish farmer worsened.

During the second triad (1974-1977) there are almost no statistically significant differences and none at all as far as the two big parties are concerned. The Hungarian and Czechoslovakian results have hardly changed in the last eight years. The recent decrease in the Hungarian Peasant party "vote" relates, as discussed earlier, to a decrease in the number of farmers. The increase in Conservatives bears out a general trend for the entire area.

Poland in the early and mid-seventies was still somewhat hopeful that the Gierek experiment might succeed, and this probably accounts for the high Democratic Socialist and the lower Christian Democratic "vote."

For the most recent triad (1978-1981), cross-national similarities are particularly evident for Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The triad indicates (and the 1981 results support it) that as many Poles now favor Christian Democracy as favor Social Democracy. This is a recent development and is unique to Poland. The explanation is the Poles' growing disenchantment with all things socialist. Solidarity's success as a union with strong religious underpinnings probably contributed to the growth in allegiance to the Christian Democrats. The most recent Polish findings, obtained after the imposition of martial law, also clearly indicate the virtual disappearance of any support for the Communist party.

Looking at the entire fourteen-year span, we find that Democratic Socialism has recovered all the ground it lost, except in Poland. Here, where critical developments in the late 1970s led to growing disappointment with any kind of socialism, the appeal of Christian Democracy is now even stronger than it was under the impact of the events of 1968. By contrast, the appeal of Democratic Socialism in Poland has been significantly weakened and—for the first time since 1971—its supporters are outnumbered by those of a Christian Democratic party.

The consistency of the results over a long period and, more importantly, the immediacy with which the findings reflected changes in political attitudes resulting from climactic political events, increases our confidence in the soundness of our method of sampling.

No question asked by the Audience and Opinion Research Division has proved as revealing as the one delving into hypothetical political affiliations. Batteries of political attitude questions have supplemented and confirmed the above results, some of which are striking. First of all, communism has failed to gain acceptance in the satellite area of the Soviet Union. The second most important finding may be the discovery of the great similarity of political attitudes from such different nationalities as the Czechs/Slovaks, the Hungarians, and the Poles. Because of their common Western tradition and value systems, a basic antipathy to communism can easily be posited. The surprising element is not only the almost all-encompassing nature of this anti-communism, but also the very similar directions this antipathy takes.

Table 8

	Triad 1968-1970			Triad 1974-1977			Triad 1978-1981		
	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland	Czechoslovakia	Hungary	Poland
Communist party	3%	4%	3%	4%	8%	4%	3%	7%	4%
Democratic Socialist party	37	31	27	43	42	46	43	42	35
Christian Democratic party	21	29	33	25	25	28	29	26	34
Peasant party	5	12	8	5	17	11	3	11	15
Conservative party	8	6	7	7	5	4	8	9	7

(Continued from page 41)

matters of abstract party loyalty rather than policy substance. Thus Republicans and Democrats are much more at odds over Ronald Reagan than they are over any of his programs or any broad area of public policy. Interestingly enough, splits involving the symbols of partisanship spill over into supposedly factual assessments. At the end of July 1983, for instance, an ABC News/*Washington Post* poll found 73 percent of Republicans believing that inflation was less a problem than it had been a year earlier, while only 44 percent of Democrats thought this was the case. The two groups' experience with inflation was essentially the same, of course, but Republicans were much more inclined to say that something good was happening under a Republican president.

Terms like "liberal" and "conservative" are also evocative symbols for Republican and Democratic identifiers. Sixty percent of the former surveyed by the NORC in 1983 wanted to call themselves conservatives, as against just 26 percent of the latter.

The basic issue of the government's role in national life divides Republican and Democratic adherents more sharply than any other policy question (pages 27 and 37). Thus 57 percent of Democrats felt in the spring of 1983 that "it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills": only 28 percent of Republicans felt this way. Rank-and-file differences on foreign policy disputes, and on issues involving women and minorities, are also evident but generally are not so large. In all these cases, the rank and file reflect differences etched more distinctly at the level of party leadership.

On a great variety of questions, the Republicans' responses brand them as more satisfied and optimistic than Democrats (page 28). For example, 74 percent of GOP backers took the position that in the United States "if you work hard eventually you will get ahead"; only 57 percent of Democrats thought this was so. One might be tempted to conclude that this is merely a product of the socioeconomic differences noted earlier: The average Republican is somewhat better off than his Democratic counterpart, making it easy for him to be a little more optimistic about the performance of his country and the character of his fellow man. In fact, however, this split is *not* explained by differences in social standing. In every educational and occupational group, Republicans are more likely than Democrats to express personal satisfaction and social optimism. Table 2 provides one example of this.

While there are indeed many more lower-status Democrats than Republicans, the party split is relatively modest at this end of the social continuum. It is far larger between high status Democrats and Republicans—in table 2, those who are college-educated. Overall, the "optimism gap" between Democrats and Republicans remains even when one controls for socioeconomic position. It reflects a more general difference of social outlook, rather than merely reports on objective experience.

Intraparty Differences

On a great many social issues, such as sexual norms and abortion, and on most civil liberties matters, interparty differences are modest, while those within each party are very large. For instance, legalized abortion for women who "are married and don't want any more children" is supported by just 32 percent of Democrats and 34 percent of Republicans with less than high school training; it is backed by 71 percent and 62 percent of Democrats and Republicans with post-graduate education. Issues like this one are highly divisive, but not along partisan lines.

The Republicans have long been described as more homogeneous than the Democrats in social group makeup; as we have seen, this depiction still applies. The GOP also appears somewhat more homogeneous in policy outlook. The educational and class groups within it are, on a number of important issues, less at odds than their counterparts within the Democratic coalition (pages 34-37).

The Democrats are split the least on basic role of government issues such as spending to improve the living standards of the poor. On such questions—the core of the New Deal agenda—Democratic partisans are most sharply at odds with Republicans, while the least polarized on group lines among themselves.

On most other issues, though, there are large and persistent class differences within the Democratic party in political outlook. As has been the case since the late 1960s, college-educated Democrats, and those in professional and managerial occupations, are markedly more liberal than those of lower socioeconomic status. Looking at the party another way, southern white Protestants appear the most uniformly conservative ethnic-regional bloc, while blacks and Jews are the most liberal. (The latter have not been shown in the graphs on pages 34-37 because in conventional surveys their numbers are too few for reliable estimates.)

Men vs. Women in the Parties

For several years now, a search has been on to locate and account for a "gender gap." Since we have been in the hunt in two earlier issues of the magazine (April/May 1982 and December/January 1983), it seems appropriate to conclude our review of intraparty splits with a comparison of male-female differences.

Our examination (see pages 38-39) turned up evidence aplenty that the gender gap may have been overgeneralized. We did find differences by sex in assessing the Reagan presidency. We were unable, though, to find many policy issues where men and women in either party differed greatly. On some questions where male-female differences were supposedly the most securely established, such as military spending, our review found no consequential split either in Republican or Democratic ranks.

Even in the instances where policy differences between men and women appear quite substantial, the overall picture is riddled with contradictions. For example, Republican women do seem more pro-government than their male co-partisans—but they are not less supportive of the Republican president who seeks to reduce government's role. These latest findings only add, then, to our impression that a clear and coherent pattern of political differences by sex has just not manifested itself. Men are generally more supportive of the Reagan presidency, and women less so. Beyond this, though, the "gender gap" seems as uncertain and elusive as it is celebrated.

[1] For supporting data, see the *Gallup Opinion Index*, June 1968.

[2] The number of cases in each age group is sufficient so that we may be reasonably confident this large variation is not due to chance alone. In the three NORC surveys, 452 respondents were ages thirty to thirty-three, while 409 were ages twenty-two to twenty-five.

(Continued from page 15)
the same result: overwhelming support for the Democratic party.

The Disadvantages

But there is a downside for Democrats, too, in this otherwise supportive picture of black motivation, ideological commitment, and economic awareness.

We are told that the Democrats are preparing for an extensive and expensive black registration drive next year. But it will have to be undertaken with great care lest it produce more new white voters than black ones. The turnout experience in the Chicago mayoral election is once again instructive. Blacks did indeed participate in record numbers. According to Michael B. Preston of the University of Illinois, voter registration increased by 29.5 percent from 1979 to 1983 in 17 predominantly black wards of Chicago. At the same time, registration in the rest of the city rose by 4 percent. Since the Chicago electorate is 40 percent black, the increase in black turnout swamped the increase in white turnout. Indeed, Preston reports that black voters out-voted whites. However, neither the national electorate nor the electorate of most states is anywhere near 40 percent black. An increase in black registration and turnout could easily be matched by a proportionately much smaller increase in white registration and turnout. In the racially polarized environment of this year's Chicago mayoral election, 82 percent of the whites voted for the Republican, who did better than any Chicago GOP candidate in the past fifty years.

Blacks today are really the base of the Democratic party and because of their sophistication and the intensity of their commitment, they are a restive element. Forty-four percent of the blacks in the *Los Angeles Times* poll felt that most Democrats are sincerely committed to helping blacks get ahead, but an almost equal number (40 percent) said they thought most Democrats don't really care much about black people—"they only want their votes." Another 15 percent of blacks weren't sure about Democrats' intentions.

Nor is the black element in the Democratic party very interested in playing coalition politics. Fifty percent said they would favor a new political party that would show more concern for black problems, and only 40 percent opposed that idea.

Such findings underscore one important reason for the Jesse Jackson movement among black Democrats: he has won the support of a separatist, critical, and idealistic element within the party to which Democrats must pay attention because of its potentially destructive implications. Thirty-five percent of registered blacks told the *Los Angeles Times* poll they would vote for Jackson if he were to run as an Independent candidate for president against Mondale and Reagan. If that were to happen, according to the poll, it would very likely throw the election to the Republicans. Supporters of Jesse Jackson for the Democratic presidential nomination said they were 54 percent to 31 percent in favor of a new black political party.

Blacks assume a position in the Democratic party that is in many ways similar to the New Right of the Republican party. Jesse Jackson, in this sense, has something in common with Jesse Helms. Blacks are motivated, they are sophisticated, and they produce votes. But in politics, as in love, total allegiance can be difficult to handle. There is a story—perhaps apocryphal—about Larry O'Brien and President Lyndon Johnson who were watching black precinct returns come in during the 1964 landslide. The then-presidential assistant is supposed to have told Johnson: "Ninety-seven percent is too much."